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THE ROLE OF DUE PROCESS IN AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAWt
W. J. Brockelbank*
The emergence of the Supreme Court of the United States in the role
of legislator is one of the most significant changes in the constitutional
law of our time. This has come about, in the main, from the attempt to
give definite meaning to certain clauses of the Constitution where no
standard by which their meaning can be determined is available. The
Constitution provides that compensation for the taking of private prop-
erty must be just, that the protection of the laws must be equal, that
punishments must be neither cruel nor unusual, that fines must not be
excessive, that searches and seizures must not be unreasonable and that
one must not be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process
of law. The Constitution itself supplies no clue by which it may be de-
termined what is just, equal, cruel, unusual, excessive, unreasonable,
or due. Yet the Supreme Court, as the chief interpreter of the Consti-
tution, must necessarily assign some meaning to each of these terms.
It is in the exercise of this function that the Supreme Court has become
an important creator of fundamental law. This is most evident in the
interpretation of the due process clauses. It is the purpose of this paper
to study this evolution.
The historical antecedents of the due process clauses are that clause
of Magna Carta by which King John promised that "no free man shall
be taken or imprisoned or disseised or outlawed or exiled or in any way
destroyed . . . save by the lawful judgment of his peers or the law of
the land" and that clause of the confirmation of Magna Carta by
Edward III, by which he ordained that "the Great Charter . . . be kept
and maintained ... and that no Man of what Estate or Condition that
he be, shall be put out of Land or Tenement, nor taken or imprisoned
t Paper to be presented at the Fourth International Congress of Comparative Law,
Paris, August 1-7, 1954.
* See Contributors' section, Masthead, p. 689 for biographical data.
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nor disinherited, nor put to death, without being brought in Answer
by due Process of Law."' Their fruit appears in the Fifth Amend-
ment to the Constitution of the United States and in the Constitutions
of all the states except five.2 After the Supreme Court of the United
States held in 1833 that the Fifth Amendment was binding only on the
federal government,3 we find "due process" turning up in the Four-
teenth Amendment adopted after the Civil War and expressly made ap-
plicable to the states by the following words: "Nor shall any state de-
prive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law."
In attempting to give some meaning to these words, one would natural-
ly seek out the meaning that was given to the same or similar words
in Magna Carta and the confirmation of Edward III from which they
were derived. However, this search, as we shall see, will not yield much
fruit for, in the seven centuries of interpretation, every word of the
famous thirty-ninth chapter has been the object of long controversy
and modern scholarship has laid bare three centuries of misinterpreta-
tion which has been used as the authentic meaning of due process of law.
Across the years there have developed two main currents of opinion
in regard to Magna Carta. One, the traditional attitude, looks upon it
as a great declaration of human rights and democratic principles, the
constituent text for trial by jury and the bulwark of liberties which
gave and guaranteed full protection for property and person to every
human being who breathes English air. No small part in establishing
this opinion must be attributed to Lord Coke. Although Coke's "notions
of history were ludicrous"4 his influence, as the embodiment of the
common law, was so strong that it is useless to contend that he "was
either misled by his sources or consciously misinterpreted them"5 for
Coke's mistakes, it is said, are the common law. Blackstone repeated
that Magna Carta protected every individual in the nation in the free
enjoyment of his life, liberty and property unless declared forfeited by
I 1 Statutes of the Realm 345. Stat. 28 Edw. III cc. 1 and 2 (1335). For two centuries
after Magna Carta, successive Kings were in the habit of confirming it. Coke states there
were over 30 such confirmations. 2 Co. Litt.* 15.
2 The five are Indiana, Kansas, New Jersey, Ohio and Oregon. Mott, Due Process of
Law § 9 (1926).
3 Baron v. Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243 (U.S. 1833). The correctness of this decision has been
bitterly attacked in a recent work, 2 Crosskey, Politics and the Constitution 1056-1082
(1953). The attack has been repulsed by Fairman, "The Supreme Court and the Consti-
tutional Limitations on State Governmental Authority," 21 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 40, 41-44
(1953).
4 Radin, "On Legal Scholarship," 46 Yale L. J. 1124, 1129 (1937).
5 Lyon, "The Lawyer and Magna Carta," 23 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 416, 431 (1951).
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the judgment of his peers or the law of the land.6 We find uncritical
acceptance of these statements today in America in articles, editorials,
national holiday orations and in a host of decisions of the Supreme
Court of the United States and of the highest courts of the several
states.7 During the Second World War the Great Charter was piously
transported for safe keeping to the Library of Congress where more
than 14,000,000 people came to view it. Lord Lothian in an address at
the Library said, "Every lawyer and every historian will agree that
here we have the nucleus of our most cherished liberties, of trial by
jury, of habeas corpus, of the principle of no taxation without repre-
sentation, of the bill of rights and of the entire constitutional struc-
ture of our modern democracy." 8 One may regard the culmination of
this current of opinion in the work of Stubbs. For him the demands
of the barons were no selfish exaction of privileges for themselves.'
Rather, the whole of the constitutional history of England is little more
than a commentary on Magna Carta,"° and the Great Charter is the
act of the united nation, the church, the barons and the commons, for
the first time thoroughly at one. 1
The other current of opinion, the critical and realistic attitude, is rep-
resented by a series of modern scholars whose only object is a deter-
mined search for truth. One must cite first the studies of Charles Petit-
Dutaillis 2 in 1894, and Edward Jenks 3 in 1904. Jenks showed that
only a small fraction of Englishmen were its beneficiaries and that it
was wrung from an unwilling king by the barons who wished only to
safeguard their own narrow interests.
Then came the serious work of McKechnie in 1905. He asserted that
the famous thirty-ninth chapter was "reactionary . . . tending to the
restoration of feudal privileges and feudal jurisdictions inimical alike to
6 2 Bi. Comm.* 162.
7 In a widely used American encyclopedia, American Jurisprudence, we find it stated
that it is settled beyond question that the principle of due process of law came from
England, that it was contained in Magna Carta as a part of the ancient English liberties
and these statements are buttressed by many citations from the courts both federal and
state. In the American Digest System the key number 251e under Constitutional Law
will lead the searcher to hundreds of cases.
8 Meyer, "Magna Carta in America," 26 A.B.AJ. 37 (1940).
9 1 Stubbs, Constitutional History of England 571 (1891).
10 Id. at 572.
11 Id. at 583.
12 Petit-Dutaillis, Etude sur la Vie Le Regne de Louis VIII 57 (1894) quoted by Lyon,
supra note 5, at 416, 417.
13 Jenks, "The Myth of Magna Carta," 4 Independent Rev. 260-273 (1904).
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the Crown and to the growth of really popular liberties."' 4 Pollock and
Maitland conclude that upon the whole the Charter is "restorative" and
in a few cases there is even "retrogression," that "even in the most
famous words of the Charter [the thirty-ninth chapter] we may detect
a feudal claim which will only cease to be dangerous when in course of
time men have distorted their meaning.. ." but "yet with all its faults
this document . . . is the nearest approach to an irrepealable 'funda-
mental statute' that England has ever had. . and in brief it means...
that the King is and shall be below the law"' 5 Subsequent serious
studies have been made by McIlwain,'8 Sir Paul Vinogradoff, Powicke, 11
Sir William Holdsworth,'18 Max Radin'9 and Bryce D. Lyon. 0
The late Professor Radin concludes that while Magna Carta is enor-
mously important in property law, its constitutional importance is slight.
Professor Lyon concludes that whether we think that the lex terrae prom-
ised freemen protection from the King's arbitrary will by the rule that
execution shall be preceded by a judgment-by a judgment of peers-
according to the time honored "tests" of battle, compurgation or ordeal,
or that the law of the land included local custom as well, we can be sure
that it did not mean due process. Lex terrae seems to mean that no
matter where or how judgments were made they must precede punitive
measures, but such a meaning does not agree with the meaning of due
process as understood by our courts.
In any case the traditional view of the equation of the lex terrae of
Magna Carta with the modern due process of our constitutional law
has been completely discredited. Whatever its meaning, it seems certain
that we have traveled too far to make a return to ancient meanings
possible. We must not be unmindful, as were the traditionalists, that
Magna Carta is a document belonging to its own century, and that at-
14 McKechnie, Magna Carta 449 (1905) quoted by McIlwain, "Due Process of Law in
Magna Carta," 14 Col. L. Rev. 27 (1914).
15 1 Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law 172-173 (2d ed. 1911).
16 McIlwain, "Due Process of Law in Magna Carta," 14 Col. L. Rev. 27 (1914), re-
printed in 1 Selected Essays on Constitutional Law 174 (1938) with an additional note
written in 1938 at 197.
17 Essays by Sir Paul Vinogradoff on Clause 39 and by Professor F. M. Powicke
on "Per Judicium Parium Vel per Legem Terrae" appear in the Magna Carta Commemo-
ration Essays (Malden ed. 1917).
18 2 Holdsworth, History of English Law 211 (3d ed. 1922). "It does not legislate for
Englishmen generally."
19 Radin, Handbook of Anglo-American Legal History c. 13 (1927) and "The Myth
of Magna Carta," 60 Harv. L. Rev. 1060 (1947).
20 Lyon, supra note 5. See also Gardner, "The Great Charter and the Case of Angilly
v. United States," 67 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1953).
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tempts to characterize it in modern terms leads to distortion. The docu-
ment must be located in the "pigeon-holes of medieval and not of mod-
ern rubrication."'" The thread of history has been broken and our
courts have turned to other sources of meaning. For every statement
making the historical connection between Magna Carta and due process
there are a hundred which, unconscious of its existence, seek some other
or fancied significance in the words themselves. In addition the wooden
application of ancient meanings would deprive the Constitution of
capacity for growth.
It is therefore wise to take a fresh start and inquire what has been
the course of meaning attributed to the due process clauses in modern
times.
What then is the modern meaning of due process? In 1954 we ought
to know. Probably more cases, more articles and more books have been
written concerning due process than any other single statutory phrase
in American Law. There are about 2000 cases in this century,s2 and
over 2000 articles and case notes since 1926.23 There are four substan-
tial treatises confined to the narrow title "due process" 24 and many
more of lesser importance,25 while general treatises on Constitutional
Law in which the subject is studied and discussed are as numberless
as the sands of the sea.
One would expect that after so much litigation and discussion for
50 years the meaning of due process would be crystal clear. Unfor-
tunately that is not true.
The Constitution of the United States as signed in 1787 did not con-
tain a Bill of Rights. The constitutive assembly at Philadelphia dis-
21 These words of Sir Paul Vinogradoff are quoted at 2 Holdsworth, History of English
Law 210.
22 A rough estimate of the number of cases appearing in the American Digest from 1897
to 1952. An average of about 93 cases a year occurred from 1936 to 1946. The present
rate is closer to 20 per year. Willis estimates that the due process clauses have been in-
volved in more litigated cases than have all the other clauses of the United States Con-
stitution combined. Willis, Constitutional Law 642 (1936).
23 The estimate was made of citations to articles, comments and case notes in the Index
of Legal Periodicals from 1926 to 1952. A spot check indicates an average of 30 per
page. This totals 2220.
24 McGehee, Due Process of Law under the Federal Constitution (1906); Taylor, Due
Process of Law and the Equal Protection of the Laws (1917); Mott, Due Process of
Law (1926); Wood, Due Process of Law 1932-1949 (1951).
25 The Columbia Law Library card catalogue lists 10 books in English and 3 in other
languages. Vose, Due Process in Wisconsin (1952) (on microfilm in the Columbia Law
Library) lists 28 books.
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cussed the question whether such a Bill should be included but the idea
prevailed that it was unnecessary because the Constitution contained no
grant of power to Congress to legislate on any of the subjects which a
Bill of Rights would comprise and it was consequently unnecessary
to declare that things should not be done which there was no power
to do.26 This decision proved to be unwise. The gap was soon noticed
when the Constitution came up for ratification in the conventions in
several states and at least six of them ratified only on the assumption of a
tacit agreement that amendments supplying a Bill of Rights would be
proposed by the First Congress.17 The First Congress proposed amend-
ments as expected and what are now the first ten amendments became
part of the Constitution on December 15, 1791. In the fifth we find the
famous line of interest to us here: "No person shall be ... deprived of
life, liberty or property without due process of law....
For 64 years these words remained without interpretation by the
Supreme Court of the United States. The first official statement came
in Den v. The Hoboken Land and Improvement Company in 1855:
The words "due process of law" were undoubtedly intended to convey
the same meaning as the words, "by the law of the land" in Magna Carta.
Lord Coke in his commentary on these words says they mean due process
of law. The constitutions which had been adopted by the several states
before the federal constitution, following the languages of the great char-
ter more closely, generally contained the words, "but by the judgment of
his peers, or the law of the land."2 8
Today there remains extant no discussion of the meaning of due
process of law contemporaneous with the adoption of the fifth amend-
ment. But we do find a statement of the meaning of the "law of the
land." Alexander Hamilton in discussing the meaning of the thirteenth
article of the New York Constitution, "that no member of the state
shall be disfranchised or defrauded of any of the rights or privileges
sacred to the subjects of this state by the Constitution, unless by the
law of the land or the judgment of his peers," states that the best com-
-mentators tell us that law of the land means "due process of law; that
is by indictment or presentment of good and lawful men and trial and
conviction in consequence." 29 Whether these words of Hamilton were
known to the court is uncertain, but the court refuses to equate due
process with the law of the land. The reason given is that the Consti-
26 Warren, The Making of the Constitution 509 (1929).
27 Id. at 768-769, Warren, "New Light on the History of the Federal judiciary Act
of 1789," 37 Harv. L. Rev. 49, 55 (1923).
28 Justice Curtis speaking for the court. 18 How. 272, 276 (U.S. 1855).
29 Alexander Hamilton, Works 231-232 (Constitutional ed. Henry Cabot Lodge 1886).
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tution already contained certain provisions regarding jury trial30 and
therefore for the Constitution to have declared in the words of Magna
Carta that no person should be deprived of his life, liberty or property
but by the judgment of his peers or the law of the land would have been
in part superfluous and inappropriate. The court then seeks a meaning
elsewhere and in answer to the question, what is due process, says:
The constitution contains no description of those processes which it
was intended to allow or forbid. It does not even declare what principles
are to be applied to ascertain whether it is due process .... To what prin-
ciples then are we to resort to ascertain whether this process, enacted by
congress, is due process? To this the answer must be twofold. We must
examine the constitution itself . .. (and) we must look to those settled
usages and modes of proceeding existing in the statute law of England,
before the emigration of our ancestors which are shown not to have been
unsuited to their civil and political condition....
From this early decision we should note three points: (1) The court
assumes that due process concerns only procedure, (2) the court already
perceives that due process is an uncharted sea where there is no "de-
scription of those processes which it was intended to allow or forbid"
and no "declaration of principles to be applied" and (3) the court, in
default of a test of due process laid down in the Constitution, invents
its own test, (a habit which has become a part of our accepted consti-
tutional technique).
Soon came the war betwen the states. The forces that liberated the
slave wished to protect him. The fourteenth amendment was the in-
strument for the purpose.3 s As we have seen, it made the prohibition
against depriving a person of life, liberty or property without due
process of law expressly applicable to the states.
It was at first narrowly interpreted. In the famous Slaughter House
Cases33 the court adopted the view that the amendment was adopted
primarily for the protection of the negro and Justice Field said that
he doubted that any action of a state not directed by way of discrimina-
tion against the negroes as a class would ever be held to come within
its purview.34
The "negro-race" theory of the amendment was short lived. In 1886
the court extended the meaning of the word "person" to include even
30 The provisions referred to are in Article III, § 2, ff 3 and in the sixth and seventh
amendments.
31 Atkins v. The Disintegrating Company, 18 Wall. 272, 276-277 (U.S. 1873).
32 See Fairman, "Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The
Original Understanding," 2 Stan. L. Rev. 5 (1949).
33 16 Wall. 36 (U.S. 1872).
34 Ibid.
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corporations." The older theory that the due process of the fifth amend-
ment concerned only procedure was overturned in 1890 in a decision
holding that the due process of the fourteenth amendment included sub-
stantive rights as well as procedural rights3 6 With the "negro race" and
the "procedure" straight jackets removed the way was cleared for the
modern development of due process.
The interpretation of due process is very different from the inter-
pretation of other expressions in the law and has presented a problem
of unusual difficulty. What has been the cause of the difficulty?
On the part of many it is a failure to analyze the nature of the prob-
lem. The chief cause of difficulty is that we have in the word "due"
an expression which in its natural meaning refers to something else
and there is nothing in the Constitution to which it can refer. In the
language of the semanticists the word "due" in the Constitution is a
sign without a referent.3 7
All this becomes apparent upon a moment's reflection. The only
dictionary equivalents for "due" here are "appropriate" and "proper."
Life, liberty or property may not be taken without due process of law,
that is, without some appropriate or proper process. The question im-
mediately arises, what is the standard which makes a given process ap-
propriate or proper? One would expect a statement of the standard to
be applied to be set out in the Constitution itself. But it is not. The
constitutional fathers did not always possess lingual sophistication,
that basic quality of a good lawyer which makes him immune to being
fooled by words and accepting verbal solutions which merely conceal
the problem." Of course it is true in daily life that symbols requiring
35 Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific R.R., 118 U.S. 394 (1886). This develop-
ment came through the efforts of Roscoe Conkling, one of the draftsmen of the fourteenth
amendment, who was counsel in the Santa Clara case. See Graham, "The 'Conspiracy
Theory' of the Fourteenth Amendment," 47 Yale LJ. 371 (1938).
36 Chicago, M. & St. P. R.R. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S..418 (1890). This is the leading
case to which the extension of due process to include substantive as well as procedural
rights is usually traced. However, the due process clause of the New York State Consti-
tution had been, much earlier, extended to substantive rights in Wynehamer v. New York,
13 N.Y. 378 (1856). Professor Corwin says this extension was plainly due to "a feeling
on the part of judges that to leave the legislature free to pass arbitrary or harsh laws,
so long as all the formalities be observed in enforcing such laws, were to yield the sub-
stance while contending for the shadow." Corwin, "Due Process of Law before the Civil
War," 24 Harv. L. Rev. 366, 460 (1911).
37 This is one of many causes of ambiguity brought out in such books as Black,
Critical Thinking, an Introduction to Logic and Scientific Method 171 (1952).
38 Leach, "Property Law Taught in Two Packages," 1 Jour. Leg. Educ. 28 (1948).
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a referent are in constant use where the referent is not spelled out. A
mother says to her child "now Johnny I want you to be good." The
referent, the measuring rod, for what is "good" is supplied by the con-
duct which, from past experience, Johnny knows his mother considers
"good." But if we were to take one of these symbols out of context
and try to discover a meaning we would feel as helpless as the layman
who visited the army mess hall at Truax Field in Wisconsin and saw
upon the wall a notice reading: "Anyone smoking in this mess hall
will be dealt with accordingly."3' 9
The difference between symbols with referents and symbols without
referents can be illustrated in other fields of law. The Uniform Nego-
tiable Instruments Law uses the word "due" as a symbol when it enacts
that a holder in due course holds the instrument free from any defect
of title of prior parties, and free from defences available to prior par-
ties among themselves.4" But the exact meaning of this expression is
made clear in another section of the same law which defines a holder
in due course as one who takes in good faith and for value an instru-
ment that is complete and regular on its face and not overdue.4
Again, Dicey in discussing contracts in the field of Conflict of Laws
says that the essential validity of a contract should be governed by
the "proper" law of the contract.42 Were this his only statement it
would have been considered utterly useless, because it would simply
pose a new problem as difficult as the first, viz., what is the "proper"
law of the contract. But Dicey, before using the symbol, gave the reader
his referent: "the proper law is the law or laws to which the parties
intended . . . to submit themselves" and accompanied it with comment
and illustrations. 43 The symbol "proper" in itself would be meaning-
less, but when explained no one can misunderstand.
Books on quasi-contracts, restitution and constructive trusts usually
contain statements that recovery is allowed to prevent "unjust" en-
richment.44 The statement in itself and unexplained in no way advances
39 23 Word Study 8 (1947) (a publication of G. and C. Merriam Company, Spring-
field, Massachusetts).
40 Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law § 57.
41 Id. § 52.
42 Dicey, Conflict of Laws Rule 160, p. 647 (5th ed. Keith, 1932).
43 Id. Rule 155 b, p. 628.
44 Keener, Quasi-Contracts 19 (1893). Woodward, Quasi-Contracts § 8 (1913). This
author avoids the expression for the most part. 3 Scott on Trusts § 462.2 (1939). In re-
viewing Keener's book in 10 Harv. L. Rev. 209 at 224 Abbot says: "This proposition is
not a reason at all. This is the very vice of the petitio principii which, more or less plausi-
bly, purports to give a reason but fails."
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our knowledge of when recovery will be allowed for it merely poses the
equally difficult problem under what circumstance is enrichment un-
just. If the symbol "unjust" is later defined in the same work, in other
words if the symbol is followed by a referent, all is well and the reader
then begins for the first time to be really informed as to the cases where
recovery will be allowed.
The problem of symbols devoid of referents in the field of Constitu-
tional law has long been noticed. Unfortunately due process is not the
only undefined symbol of the Constitution, but the problem is essen-
tially the same in regard to all of them. The following excerpts show
how the problem has been expressed by notable commentators:
In consequence of the modern doctrine of due process as "reasonable
law" judicial review ceases to have definite statable limits, and while the
extent to which the court will recanvass the factual justification of a statute
under the due process clauses . . . often varies considerably between
cases, yet this is a matter which in the last analysis depends upon the
court's own discretion and on nothing else. 45
The only general principle of interpreting the "due process of law"
clause would appear to be this: legislation which appears to the majority
of the Supreme Court of the United States as shockingly unfair to the
... individual affected is unconstitutional.46
If we are not to stray outside the body of the constitution to establish
the meaning of its provisions, there is no way to determine the present
meaning of "due process" for without the foundation of its significance as
it existed at the time of its inclusion in the fifth amendment the phrase
would be stripped of all its vitality.47
The Supreme Court is a constitutional convention always in session.48
Legal critics have been distressed to find that through their selective
application of the due process concept, judges have moulded the law
to coincide with their prejudices.49
An informed study of the work of the Supreme Court of the United
States will probably lead to the conclusion that no nine men are wise
enough and good enough to be entrusted with the power which the un-
45 Corwin, The Constitution and What it Means Today 193 (1947 ed.).
46 William Draper Lewis, 243 Annals of American Academy Political and Social Sci-
ence 63, (Jan. 1946),
47 Note, 36 Geo. L. J. 398, 409 (1948).
48 Quotation from Hugh Willis by Hanna, "Equal Footing in the Admission of States,"
3 Baylor L. Rev. 519 at 524 (1950). See also Patterson, "The Supreme Court as a Consti-
tutional Convention," 23 Tulane L. Rev. 431 (1949). Beck, The Constitution of the United
States 221 (1928) stated:
The Supreme Court is not only a court of justice but in a qualified sense a continuous
constitutional convention. It continues the work of the Convention of 1787 by adapt-
ing through interpretation the great charter of government, and thus its duties become
political in the highest sense of the word, as well as judicial.
49 Vose, Due Process of Law in Wisconsin c. V (on micro-film in the Columbia Law
Library).
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limited provisions of the due process clauses confer. We have had fifty
years experiment with the Fourteenth Amendment, and the centralizing
authority lodged with the Supreme Court over the domestic affairs of
forty-eight widely different states is an authority which it simply can-
not discharge with safety either to itself or to the states.50
The judges themselves have perceived the contours of the problem
here discussed and have not been averse to expressing their opinion.
The venerable Holmes in 1929 said:
I have not yet adequately expressed the more than anxiety that I feel at
the ever increasing scope given to the Fourteenth Amendment in cutting
down what I believe to be the constitutional rights of the states. As the de-
cisions now stand, I see hardly any limit but the sky to the invalidating of
those rights if they happen to strike a majority of the court as for any
reason undesirable .... 51
In 1952 Judge Learned Hand wrote:
"What is freedom of speech and of the press"; what is the "establishment
of religion and the free exercise thereof"; what are "unreasonable search-
es," "due process of law," and "equal protection of the law"; all these are
left wholly undefined and cannot be effectively determined without some
acquaintance with what men in the past have thought and felt to be their
most precious interest. Indeed these fundamental canons are not jural
concepts at all, in the ordinary sense; and in application they turn out
to be no more than admonitions of moderation, as appears from the
varying and contradictory interpretations that the judges themselves find
it necessary to put upon them .... 52
In 1954, Justice Clark, in a case concerning an unusual violation of the
privacy of a home, said:
... a case by case approach to due process... makes for such uncertainty
and unpredictability that it would be impossible to foretell-other than by
guesswork-just how brazen the invasion of the intimate privacies of one's
home must be in order to shock itself into the protective arms of the
Constitution ... The practical result ... is simply that when five Justices
are sufficiently revolted by local police action a conviction is over-
turned. .... .1
These excerpts show that both learned authors and judges admit
that the court is necessarily engaged in legislating, if not constitution
making, when it has the task of interpreting one of these constitutional
symbols that has no constitutional definition. It is a rather significant
fact that this has been perceived by the draftsmen of the constitutions
of other democratic countries and for that reason the due process clause
50 Frankfurter, Law and Politics 16 (1939).
51 Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U.S. 586, 595 (1929).
52 Hand, "Freedom and the Humanities," 38 Bull. of the Amer. Ass'n of University
Professors 521 (1952).
53 Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 at 138 (1954).
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has not been copied. For example, when Mr. Astor proposed to amend
the Irish Home Rule Bill by incorporating the due process clause, his
motion was lost on such arguments as the following:
Mr. John Ward: What the right honorable gentlemen are suggesting is
that we should have . . . a sort of general provision so as to enable the
courts of the country to question and decide whether any law passed by
the Parliament of Ireland ... may be taken from the floor of the house
jo. .and be decided by pundits on the benches of the country. I venture
to say no more dangerous proposition has ever been suggested in this
House .... The operation of this clause of the American Constitution is
best typified by the terrible story of the industrial conditions in regard to
women and children .... These things are not allowed to be decided ...
in accordance with the overwhelming majority of the people but . . . on
some wretched legal formula settled in courts where popular opinion has
not the slightest influence and the demand for justice for the poor is very
rarely heard.54
Mr. Asquith: Without concerning myself for a moment with the actual
language of the amendment, its object is to assert in terms that the Irish
Parliament shall not pass legislation which no civilized legislature ought
to pass or could pass .... The language here used.., is full of ambiguity,
abounding in pitfalls and certainly provocative of every kind of frivolous
litigation .... In every case you have adjectives ... and they are really
all matters of opinion bias or inclination and judgment which cannot be
acted upon under anything like settled rules of law .... I cannot imagine
any subject... in regard to which the decisions of the tribunals would be
received with less general respect .... If you introduce into your bill a
limitation of this kind of the powers of the legislature you are . . . really
enthroning the judiciary as the ultimate tribunal of appeal. 55
The words of Mr. Asquith may have crossed the ocean for in 1918
we find the late Professor Albert M. Kales saying:
In addressing the court in due process cases one should not commence
with the usual salutation "May it please the Court." Instead one should
say "My Lords." Backed by and charged with the enforcement of the due
process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments, the Supreme
Court of the United States is the American substitute for the British
House of Lords. It constitutes the real and only second chamber of the
federal government. It is a second conservative chamber for each of the
state governments.56
At times when the court's discharge of this legislative responsibility
became distasteful, proposals to modify it were made. In 1924 Senator
Robert LaFollette, candidate for the Presidency on the Progressive
ticket, proposed a constitutional amendment empowering Congress by a
two-thirds vote to override any Supreme Court decisions holding a
54 42 H.C. Deb. 2218-2220 (Sth series 1912).
55 Id. at 2229-2231.
5I Kales, "New Methods in Due Process Cases," 12 Amer. Pol. Sci. Rev. 241 (1918),
reprinted in 1 Selected Essays on Constitutional Law 488 (1938).
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statute unconstitutional, and in 1937 Senator Borah proposed a consti-
tutional amendment to divest the court of power to deal with substan-
tive due process. 7
Do judges make law or only discover the law?5" The realists today
unhesitatingly answer "they make law" for is not the whole mass of the
common law a monument to the work of the judges? Ordinarily the
direct intention is never to make law. Law is rather but a by-product
that accretes at glacier speed. However, in the due process cases the
accretion is rapid and immediate and the intention to make law is often
direct. In any case it is inevitable. We may say then that the court,
in deciding whether a given statute violates the due process of law
clauses, is engaged directly in legislating.
It is important to note at this point how this species of judicial
legislation differs from ordinary legislation, that is, from legislation
coming from the legislative assemblies.
First, it depends for its promulgation on the existence of a case. No
court has power per se to review and annul any statute on the ground
of unconstitutionality. That question may be considered only when a
justiciable issue must be decided in litigation. Then the power exer-
cised is that of deciding the case before the court. It amounts to little
more than the negative power to disregard what is thought to be an un-
constitutional enactment, which otherwise would stand in the way of
the enforcement of a legal right.5" The result is that law may rest upon
the statute books for years and the judges may privately be of the
opinion that it is unconstitutional, but until someone brings a case, the
court is without power to act. In the meantime the statute may be re-
spected by the public and enforced by the executive. Even when held
unconstitutional, the statute may still produce certain collateral effects,
and to the extent abrogated may be reinstated by a new case, while a
repealed statute must be re-enacted by a later session of the legislature.
Nor can the court make rules in anticipation of future cases except
by way of dicta. In short, legislative enactments destroy and reform
at the will of the legislature while judicial legislation destroys and
57 See 123 Literary Digest 8 for March 6, 1937 and 38 Col. L. Rev. 569 (1938).
58 See Chaffee, "Do Judges Make or Discover Law?" 91 Proc. Am. Phil. Soc. 405-
412, 419-420 reprinted in Fryer and Benson, Legal Method and System 124 (1934), and
Cohen, Law and the Social Order 112 (1933) (chapter entitled the Process of Judicial
Legislation).
59 This is substantially the statement of justice Sutherland in Frothingham v. Mellon,
262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923).
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reforms only when a litigant brings an appropriate case before the
court.
Secondly, there exists a surprisingly large field of judicially unenforce-
able provisions in the Constitution, and as to these the courts have no
power to legislate under the due process clauses or otherwise.6" The
Constitution itself may provide that a given question must be settled by
a department of government other than the judiciary. For example,
each house of the legislature is the judge of its own elections,6 and
the executive authority shall issue writs of election to fill vacancies. 6
Thirdly, the Supreme Court of the United States has declared that
it has no jurisdiction to decide "political questions." The exact limits
of this expression are perhaps impossible to determine but a few exam-
ples will illustrate its purpose. The court will not decide questions
regarding the relation of the United States to other nations. The Con-
gress is given power to declare war,6 and the President and the Senate
the power to conclude treaties. 4 "The United States shall guarantee to
every state a republican form of government,"65 but what is a republi-
can form of government has always been considered a political ques-
tion.66 A state has no standing to invalidate a congressional grant of
funds subject to conditions it does not approve.67 The suggestion has
been made that the court should have regarded as "political" questions
involving social and industrial legislation that have been the object of
important constitutional cases in recent years because in such cases the
measure of due process approaches the measure of political wisdom and
the function of determining political policy is with the legislature and
not the courts.6 The advantageous division of labor between legislature
and judiciary is thus upset. The legislature is composed of members
representing all shades of opinion and may freely call to its hearings not
60 This is especially true in the field of state constitutional law. See Dodd, "Judicially
Nonenforceable Provisions of Constitutions," 80 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 54 (1931), reprinted, in
1 Selected Essays on Constitutional Law 355 (1938).
61 U.S. Const. Art. I, § 5.
62 Id. Art. I, § 2, ff 4.
63 Id. Art. I, § 8, f 11. Prize Cases, 2 Black 635 (U.S. 1862).
64 Id. Art. II, § 2, f 2. Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270 (1901).
65 Id. Art. IV, § 4.
66 Pac. State Tel. and Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912); Luther v. Borden, 7
How. 1 (U.S. 1849).
67 Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 477 (1922).
68 The suggestion is by Finkelstein, in "Judicial Self-Limitation," 37 Harv. L. Rev. 338
(1923). It gave rise to a small pamphlet war. See Weston, "Political Questions," 38
Harv. L. Rev. 296 (1925) and Finkelstein, "Further Notes on Judicial Self-Limitation,"
39 Harv. L. Rev. 221 (1925).
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only interested witnesses from both sides but also totally disinterested
witnesses. On the other hand the court must depend for its information
on witnesses called by the parties who represent the selfish interests of
their masters. Despite all this the court has not hesitated to take juris-
diction in due process cases involving questions of far reaching political
policy and thus has continued to legislate.
We have said that the "due" of due process is a symbol without a
referent, that lacking a definition there is nothing to which it can refer
and therefore the meaning is abortive. But may it not be said that this
word, like many others used in law at this period, makes implicit refer-
ence to natural law, those revealed rules of conduct binding on all men
and sanctioned by the dictates of right reason?
The theory of natural law, having roots as far back as Plato and
Aristotle, was given added weight by the prestige of Grotius and New-
ton in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and by the publication
of John Locke's Second Treatise on Civil Government in 1690. Add to
these the influence of Rousseau's theory of the social contract, which
was certainly fresh in the minds of the constitutional fathers, and it
must be admitted that the framers of the fifth amendment did make im-
plicit reference to natural law. What is more, the influence of such the-
ories has had an enormous influence in its interpretation for over a
century. 9
But all this scarcely advances the argument that the expression, due
process of law, has any readily ascertainable precision of meaning. The
reference to natural law only shifts the argument from one symbol
"due" to other symbols that are equally incapable of precision. The
one perfect law, that is the best of all possible rules to govern the rela-
tions of man to man, is to be discovered by a process of revelation or
reason. As to the revelation, it happens that some ninety million Ameri-
cans belong to about 250 religious bodies and that about seventy million
other Americans belong to none.70 The chaos resulting from this babel
of voices is well illustrated by the diversity and conflicting tangle in
the American law of marriage and divorce, a subject long thought to
69 See Corwin, "The 'Higher Law' Background of American Constitutional Law,"
42 Harv. L. Rev. 149, 365 (1929), reprinted in 1 Selected Essays on Constitutional Law 1
(1938); Manion, "The Founding Fathers and the Natural Law," 35 A.B.J. 461 (1949) ;
Haines, The Revival of Natural Law Concepts (1930); Grant, The Natural Law Back-
ground of the Fourteenth Amendment, 31 Col. L. Rev. 56 (1931).
70 World Almanac 705 (1954).
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be peculiarly within the jurisdiction of revealed truth.7 - To make any
claim that a reference to natural law is to give precision of meaning
to due process on the basis of revealed truth is to jump from the frying
pan into the fire.
Nor do we find firmer ground with reason. The question becomes
whose reason? That of Karl Marx or of Adam Smith, that of the revo-
lutionists or the evolutionists, that of the historical jurists, the transcen-
dentalists, or the pragmatists, that of the sociologists or the realists?
The list could easily be extended.
The contention of every litigant makes its appeal to reason in all the
great problems that have harassed the Supreme Court in the due process
cases. And so we go up one blind alley and down another. In the end
the reference to natural law solves nothing. It only diverts the problem,
gives us something else to talk about, but finally we are in the same
position as we were before. 2
To gain a clearer picture of our position let us summarize:
1. Although the historical roots of due process of law go back to
the Great Charter and its subsequent confirmation by Edward III these
sources can have no significance in the interpretation of due process to-
day. Magna Carta is a medieval document belonging to its own cen-
tury.
2. The earliest case to interpret "due process of law" in the fifth
amendment considered it a procedural measure only and one in which
there was no description of the processes that it was intended to allow
or forbid; and the earliest case to interpret the same expression in the
fourteenth amendment regarded it only as a measure for the protection
of the negro race. Soon however, both the procedural and the negro
race limitations were removed.
3. The fundamental difficulty of interpretation is the lack of any
71 A report from the Commission on Human Rights of the United Nations states that
"the long debate on this controversial subject demonstrated the great difficulty in writing
a satisfactory text on marriage and the family . . . that would be consistent with the
various profoundly different religious faiths, cultures and legal systems." Dep't State Bull.
218 (Aug. 17, 1953).
72 See Beutel, "Relationship of Natural Law to Experimental jurisprudence," 13 Ohio
State L.J. 167 (1952). The court in Fisch v. General Motors Corporation, 169 F.2d 266
at 270 (6th Cir. 1948) refused to take cognizance of a reference to natural law in these
words:
... a court cannot declare a statute unconstitutional . . .because it is supposed to
violate some natural ... rights of a citizen unless it can be shown that . .. such rights
are protected by the Constitution.
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standard by which due-ness can be determined, for it is an undefined
symbol which has no meaning in itself. This difficulty has been noticed
by commentators, judges and draftsmen of foreign constitutions.
4. The court in attempting to give a meaning is engaged directly in
legislating. But judicial legislation, unlike legislative legislation, must
await a case, cannot make rules for the future and is subject to other
limitations.
5. The reference to natural law as a standard of due-ness, while
a historical fact, is useless as an interpretative solvent today, for it
pose more questions than it answers.
All this looks like a stalemate. And stalemate it is if we wish to
find any inherent meaning in due process. Theoretically a constitutional
amendment might give a definition, but politically it is not possible when
most people, even many lawyers, do not perceive the nature of the diffi-
culty. Our constitutional sense has atrophied. We once put our con-
stitution on .paper and told the judges, willy nilly, to make the most of
it. Under these circumstances it remains only to examine the cases
to discover in what fields the Court itself has felt the stalemate and in
what fields it has given the country an acceptable body of judicial
legislation.
Unfortunately there are over 2,000 cases and to trace, even in barest
outline, the multiple trends of interpretation through this mass of liti-
gation is beyond the scope of this paper. Rather, it is proposed to take
as examples a few of the outstanding problems and indicate the turn-
ing points in interpretation in order to discover some of the characteris-
tic ways in which the court has discharged its responsibility. We may
begin with the cases on the regulation of business.
The nineteenth century attitude of the Court permitted legislatures
considerable freedom. If a business was "affected with a public in-
terest" a state might establish maximum rates for its services. 3 A city
might regulate the hours of operation of laundries74 and the state could
forbid the sale of oleomargarine.75 But soon laissez-faire economics and
the concept of liberty of contract found their way into the Constitution
and the Court denied the right of a state to limit work in bakeries to
60 hours a week,76 fix prices or establish a licensing system for busi-
73 Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876).
74 Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27 (1885).
75 Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678 (1888).
76 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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nesses not affected with a public interest.77 So sacred did the liberty
to contract become that the Court forbade both the federal 7 and the
state79 legislatures to prevent discrimination against employees on the
basis of labor union membership and forbade the Congress to establish
minimum wages for women in the District of Columbia."' But a change
was in the offing. An old saying has it that "the Court follows the
election returns," and perhaps we should add "at some distance."
When a large majority of the voters carried Franklin D. Roosevelt
into the Presidency, he characterized these fields in which neither na-
tional nor state legislatures could pass social legislation as the "No
Man's Land" of the Supreme Court. The phrase had telling effect only
second to his "court packing" plan which quickly followed suit. The
change came in 1934 when the Court decided that New York could set
minimum resale prices for milk.8" No longer need a business be "affected
with a public interest"; but it is sufficient if it can be shown that con-
trol is for the public good. Soon the Court did an about-face on mini-
mum wages for women 2 and later allowed a state to fix rates for the
services of an employment agency.83 A litigant was able to show some
reason why funeral directors should not be at the same time insurance
agents and a statute prohibiting the dual employment was upheld. 4
House to house canvassing in the absence of an invitation from the
householders could be forbidden by a state statute.8 5 State public
utility commissions have come to have virtually a free hand in rate
making, Justice Frankfurter saying that "it is not for the federal courts
to supplant the Commission's judgment even in the face of convincing
proof that a different result would have been better."8 6
Finally we come to the California Compulsory Assigned Risk Law
which compelled each insuring unit to take the equitable proportion of
risks classified as "poor" which the California Insurance Department
assigned to it. Justice Douglas said the consequent diminution in value
of the plaintiff's business did not rise "to the dignity of a taking in the
77 Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 235 (1929).
78 Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908).
79 Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915).
80 Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
81 Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
82 West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
83 Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236 (1941).
84 Daniel v. Family Security Life Insurance Co., 336 U.S. 220 (1949).
85 Beard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
86 Railroad Commission v. Rowan and Nichols Oil Co., 310 U.S. 573, 584 (1940).
See also, Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
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constitutional sense" and Justice Black was in favor of dismissing the
appeal on the ground that the constitutional questions were frivolous. 7
When we reach the position that the raising of the argument of vio-
lation of due process is considered frivolous by the Supreme Court we
can say with Harris that "the due process clause no longer is merely
in eclipse-it has fallen into the sea."88 We may conclude that in the
field of the regulation of business the court is conscious of the stalemate
and seems to have closed up its constitutional shop so far as invalidating
statutes on the ground of violation of due process is concerned. Of
course, there is no assurance that the Supreme Court will continue of
the same mind, but for the present one would be safe in saying that it
would require an unusually arbitrary or discriminatory statute to reopen
the door.
When we turn from business regulation to protection of persons ac-
cused of crime we find not a stalemated court, but a court with a mis-
sion, determined to eradicate from America the asperities of criminal
procedure.
In a case attracting nation wide attention the Court declared that to
deny a poor underprivileged defendant the right to counsel in his de-
fense was to violate due process. 9 Since then the court has pretty con-
sistently held the right to counsel a fundamental ingredient of due
process, at least in cases of importance where the defendant is unable
to defend himself." But this does not mean that each state must set
up a public defender system for the rule is not absolute and each case
will be judged on its own merits.9
87 California State Automobile Ass'n Inter-Insurance Bureau v. Maloney, 341 U.S. 105,
111 (1951). See on the whole subject of regulation of business, Harris, "Freedom and the
Business Man," 37 Iowa L. Rev. 196 (1951); Divine, "Constitutionality of Economic
Regulations," 2 J. of Pub. Law 98 (1953).
88 Harris, supra note 87 at 201.
89 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
90 Hawk v. Olson, 326 U.S. 271 (1945); Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786 (1945); Williams
v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471 (1945); Glasser v. U.S., 315 U.S. 60 (1942) ; Avery v. Alabama, 308
U.S. 444 (1940).
91 In Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 at 462 (1942) Justice Roberts said:
Asserted denial is to be tested by an appraisal of the totality of the facts in a given
case. That which may, in one setting constitute a denial of fundamental fairness,
may, in other circumstances . . . fall short of such denial.
In Quicksall v. Michigan, 339 U.S. 660 (1950) it was held that the absence of counsel,
in a hearing leading to a conviction ten years earlier, in the case of a fairly intelligent
defendant with some prior experience in court was insufficient to discharge the prisoner
on the ground that due process had been violated.
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In the attempted supervision of state criminal procedure through the
due process clause the key case is that of Adamson v. California.2 A
California statute provided that both court and counsel might comment
on the failure of a defendant in a criminal case to take the witness stand
and permitted the jury to consider the comment. Upon conviction, the
defendant conteilded before the Supreme Court that this process was
less than that due him at the hands of the state, for the simple reason
that the Fifth Amendment provision that no person shall be compelled,
in any criminal case, to be a witness against himself had become a
restriction on the state through the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Thus was initiated the great debate on whether the pro-
visions of the Bill of Rights, or any of them, were incorporated in the
Fourteenth Amendment. As we have seen, the Court held, at an early
date, that the Bill of Rights was applicable only to the federal govern-
ment." Now it was contended that the framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment intended the expression "due process" to carry over to the
states the privilege against self-incrimination. Five justices rejected
the argument chiefly on the basis of a decision of forty years stand-
ing.94 Four justices believed that the Bill of Rights must be applied
to the States in toto but three of them thought that the Bill of Rights
did not express all the protection afforded by that Amendment and that
more might be added. Justice Black alone believed that the Bill of
Rights constituted both the maximal and minimal limits of the mean-
ing of due process in the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus was precipi-
tated a major controversy on the technique of discovering the scope of
due process.
Mr. Justice Black based his argument that the Bill of Rights was in-
cluded in due process in a study of les travaux preparatoires and the
dissenting opinions of Mr. Justice Harlan in three historic cases."'
What was the original intention? Corwin in 1908 had stated "There
can be no kind of doubt that its authors [authors of the Fourteenth
Amendment] designed that, at the very least, it should make the first
eight amendments binding upon the States as well as the federal gov-
ernment." 96 More recently the historical thesis of Justice Black has
92 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
93 Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243 (U.S. 1833).
94 Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
95 Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 114 (1908); Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581,
605 (1900); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 518 (1884).
96 Corwin, "The Supreme Court and the Fourteenth Amendment," 7 Mich. L. Rev.
643, 644 (1908).
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been examined by Professor Fairman, .7 who concludes that the record
of history is overwhelmingly against him. In similar vein Professor
Morrison states that Justice Black's historical research "will not stand
critical examination.198
However important the search for historical truth may be, it is more
important for our purpose to discover the technique of interpretation.
How does the Court go about the task of assigning content to the due
process clause?
As far as Justice Black is concerned, his purpose becomes evident
from his opinions in other cases. We have seen that the Court in an
early decision determined the content of due process by examining the
Constitution itself and looking at "those settled usages and modes of
proceeding existing in the state law of England, before the emigration
of our ancestors, which are shown not to have been unsuited to their
civil and political condition."99 But with the extension of due process
to cover substantive rights came the notion that due process in the
procedural field was equivalent to a fair trial,1°0 or consistency with
the fundamental principles of liberty and justice"0 ' or what is implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty."'02 These additions cannot be traced
to any original English meaning but rather have their origin in concepts
of natural law. Now it happens that the whole idea of natural law is
distasteful to Justice Black. He so expressed himself in the Adamson
case.0 3 So when his colleagues in substantive law cases on the regula-
tion of business based their decision on natural law, Justice Black urged
that we should return to the ancient notion that due process was a
matter of procedure only.0 4 But when we turn to the cases on civil
97 Fairman, "fDoes the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The
Original Understanding," 2 Stan. L. Rev. 5, 139 (1949).
98 Morrison, "Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of 'Rights? The
Judicial Interpretation," 2 Stan. L. Rev. 140, 171 (1949).
99 See note 28 supra.
100 This idea was developed in Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97 (1878).
101 Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312 (1926).
102 Justice Cardozo in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
103 He said:
I think that decision [Twining v. New Jersey] and the "natural law" theory of the
Constitution upon which it relies degrade the constitutional safeguards of the Bill
of Rights and simultaneously appropriate for this Court a- broad power which we
are not authorized by the Constitution to exercise.
332 U.S. 46, 70 (1947).
104 In United Gas Public Service Co. v. Texas, 303 U.S. 123 (1938) he expressed the
opinion that the assurance of a fair trial was the only matter involved, and in Federal
Power Commission v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575 (1942) he was willing to
deny to the Court the right of review of public utility rates.
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liberties Justice Black becomes a judge with a mission. For him civil
liberties must receive the solicitous protection of the Court. But
civil liberties called for not only procedural due process but substan-
tive due process as well. The only position then to fit this congerie of
convictions was to contend that the Bill of Rights, which contained all
the civil liberty provisions dear to his heart, be applied in toto to the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Since power to regulate
business was not expressed in the Bill of Rights but civil liberties were,
this contention fitted his purpose like a glove.
Let us isolate and examine this technique. First, Justice Black relies
upon history. To do so is to disregard completely the theory of the
Constitution as a vital and growing document. Everyone admits today
that it has grown and must grow. So in any case the argument of
history is not conclusive. It is, at most, a make-weight which of itself
is not very important in the acute problems of today that, in almost
every sphere, transcend everything that could have been even imagined
by the authors of 1787 or even of 1868.
But if the argument of history is to have decisive effect, it is important
that the historical research be complete and accurate. It was not.10 5
Then we see his conclusion, that the Bill of Rights is to be incor-
porated in the Fourteenth Amendment, flowing from three convictions:
(a) That no reference to natural law to clarify the process is proper,
(b) that statutes regulating business must be upheld, and (c) that civil
liberties must be protected. None of these is expressed as such in the
Constitution. None of them flows necessarily from the text of the due
process clause. Here then is the essence of the method. Statutes are
held to be constitutional or unconstitutional depending on some pri-
vate convictions of the justices. This is proof, again, if any were needed,
that the Justices are legislating.
The opinion of Justice Black is studied here as an attempt to show
one way in which a great justice comes to a judicial decision. That
particular method probably will not be employed by others for the
method grows out of the particular convictions of Justice Black. Other
convictions, another background, a different education and another set
of motives will command a different result on the part of others. But
in the due process cases it is important to notice that it is the total per-
sonality of the judge that is speaking when he gives his opinion and
it is not and cannot be any inherent meaning in the constitutional words.
105 This conclusion seems inevitable after the very careful studies of Professors Fairman
and Morrison, supra notes 97 and 98.
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There is nothing new in the above statement. Justice Stone in 1936
observed, "While constitutional exercise of power by the executive and
legislative branches is subject to judicial restraint, the only check on
our exercise of power is our own sense of self restraint."' 06 Justice
Frankfurter, while admitting the necessity of self limitation, nevertheless
is of the opinion that some test exists and thinks the court must attempt
to apply it. In a recent case he said:
This Court must give the freest possible scope to states in the choice of
their methods of criminal procedure. But those procedures cannot include
methods that may fairly be deemed in conflict with deeply rooted feelings
of the community .... Of course this is a most difficult test to apply, but
apply it we must, warily and from case to case.... Our constitutional sys-
tem makes it the Court's duty to interpret those feelings of society to
which the Due Process clause gives legal protection. Because of their in-
herent vagueness the tests by which we are to be guided are most un-
satisfactory but such as they are we must apply them. (Emphasis sup-
plied.)107
The inner mind and creed of both Justices Black and Frankfurter
have been subjected to a searching study by Professor Braden who
says, "They both put into the Fourteenth Amendment what they want
to."'08 After examination of their separate attempts at self limitation,
he says:
Each theory collapses, on analysis, into little more than a front for policy
making... Perhaps Mr. Justice Frankfurter measures his power, finds it
precarious and retreats. If so, that is the cause of the retreat, not 'society's
opinion.' Perhaps Mr. Justice Black is stymied by an inability to maneuver
around "specific" words. If so, it is a lack of ingenuity, a fear of criticism,
or a judgment of the reaction to the transparency of his maneuver which
stops him, not the "specific" words.' 09
In recent years the Court's work has been channelled in a new direc-
tion. Until 1938, the cases coming to the Court under its diversity
jurisdiction"0 played an important role in helping to determine state
law."' But the abandonment of this position in 1938 in Erie R.R. v.
106 United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 79 (1936).
107 Haley v. State, 332 U.S. 596, 604 (1948).
108 Braden, "A Search for Objectivity in Constitutional Law," 57 Yale LJ. 571, 591
(1948).
109 Id. at 593-594.
110 They include ". . . Cases . . .between Citizens of different States;-between Citi-
zens of the same state claiming Lands, under Grants of different States . . ." according
to U.S. Const. Art. M, § 2.
111 The basic case, followed for nearly a century, is Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1 (U.S
1842).
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Tompkins"2 obliterated the creative role of the federal courts and trans-
formed them into mere automatons that follow the pronouncements of
state courts. So we may say that, since 1938 the significance of the
Supreme Court as a factor in determining state law has been reduced
almost to the vanishing point while its significance as an arbiter of
federal questions has been correspondingly increased.
The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court based on the existence of a
federal question includes cases involving the Constitution, federal laws
and treaties. Cases concerning treaties are few. Those concerning the
interpretation of federal laws and problems of federal procedure proba-
bly account for the bulk of the work of the Court. Yet there are still
a large number of cases decided under and controlled by the Constitu-
tion. While these cases may entail the interpretation of any and every
clause of that document, concentration is apt to occur on fundamental
issues that still remain unsettled. It is not surprising therefore that
due process is still a large part of the court's business."'
It would be a mistake to conclude from the assertion that the Supreme
Court is engaging in legislation that it does so without restraint. It lacks
the free hand of the ordinary legislative chamber. When the Court
is bent on creating some new law it is hemmed in by a whole series of
traditional obstacles. Tradition requires that the Court write an opinion.
The task of expressing the collective opinion of the Court is assigned to
one Justice, but in recent years there is a tendency of each of the others,
even when in agreement, to write a concurring opinion to explain to the
bar and to posterity his particular rdasons for agreement. Frequently
there are also dissenting opinions. Then the doctrine of stare decisis
comes into play and this compels the Court either to follow precedent
or frankly to overrule and give its reasons. In short the Court keenly
feels the obligation to make out of its decisional law a consistent and
logical whole. This impulsion of consistency and logic is accompanied
by certain fears: the immediate fear of seeming ridiculous in the eyes
of fellow judges or the bar, and the ultimate fear of seeming ridiculous
in the eyes of history and posterity.
Within the framework of these traditional restraints the Supreme
Court has become a symbol. It may be the American version of a throne.
As such what has been its effect?
112 304 U.S. 64 (1938). See Stinson, "Swift v. Tyson-What Remains?," 24 Cor-
nell L.Q. 54 (1938) and Broh-Kahn, "Amendment by Decision-More on the Erie Case,"
30 Ky. L.J. 3 (1941).
113 This is the conclusion stated in the Summary of the October 1952 Term in 73 Sup.
Ct. 87, 112-114 (1953).
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In some areas its effect has been to conserve, maintain the status quo
and, in the minds of some, to retard progress. For instance the Congress
in 1916 attempted indirectly to abolish child labor by a law prohibiting
the transportation in interstate commerce of manufactured goods, the
product of factories where children under fourteen years of age were
employed. The Court held the law unconstitutional." 4 In 1919 the
Congress again attempted a similar oblique control of child labor by
imposing a 10 per cent excise tax on the entire net profits of persons
knowingly employing children. The attempt met a similar fate." 5 Foiled
in these two attempts the Congress proposed the Child Labor Amend-
ment to the States in 1924. But its passage became unnecessary when
Hammer v. Dagenhart was overruled and the Fair Labor Standards Act
of 1938, prohibiting the shipment in interstate commerce of goods pro-
duced by child labor, was held constitutional."' Thus the early con-
servative position of the Court in 1918 was reversed by 1941.
The tendency to conserve existing patterns and hold fast to that which
is may be illustrated by the recent Steel Mills Seizure caselir in which
the Court restrained the executive from seizing and operating steel mills
in order to prevent a strike that threatened to stop the continuous flow
of steel to the nation's defense plants. This decision on the limits of
powers lodged respectively in the executive and the legislative depart-
ments of government represents a considered judgment that even a Presi-
dent may not go beyond what a majority of the Court considers his
constitutional role. The decision stands as a limitation of executive
power in favor of the legislative and may be thought of as a reaffirma-
tion of Montesquieu to the effect that liberty is best preserved and arbi-
trary authority controlled by a strict separation of the powers of gov-
ernment.
On the other hand the Court, in recent years, has played an im-
portant role in curbing particular outbursts of barbaric brutality by
state police and in regulating the use of coerced confessions in evi-
dence." 8
114 Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
15 Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20 (1922).
116 United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
117 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). The decision has
been noted in a great many law reviews. One of the best is Bischoff, "Constitutional Law
and Civil Rights," 28 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 57 (1953).
118 The story is too long to attempt even a compressed survey here. The evolution may
be traced from Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) to Irvine v. California, 347 US.
128 (1954). Hall, "Police and Law in a Democratic Society," 28 Ind. L. Rev. 133 at
154 (1953) says, "It is estimated there were three and one-half million illegal arrests in
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The Court's influence is broader than the cases. It is true that, for
direct legislation, it must await a case" 9 but the effect of the case once
decided permeates everywhere. If the court has invalidated state action,
that state and all others have learned a lesson and they are not likely
to try something which, being within the principle stated, will invite
a like invalidity later. The court opinion thus overhangs and conditions
the choice among alternative courses of action. This has long been true
of the States and the Congress. It is now true of the Executive. 2 '
The Court itself has become increasingly conscious of its own power
to direct and guide the course of institutions and policies of American
life. This appears when one unmasks some of the conventional dis-
guises.
The Court has called attention to the "great gravity and delicacy" of
its function in passing upon the validity of an act of Congress and,
for all cases within its jurisdiction, has laid down rules of self limi-
tation in an attempt to avoid passing on constitutional questions. Among
these is the rule that the Court will not "anticipate a question of con-
stitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it."'' The Court
has the habit of refusing to consider a point not presented in the in-
ferior courts'22 and Rule 38 of the Revised Rules of the Supreme Court
states: "Only the questions specifically brought forward by the petition
for certiorari will be considered."' 2 3 But when the Court feels that in-
justice has been done, it may take the bit in its teeth, overturn tradi-
tion and reverse a state decision on a point which it ferrets out on its
own initiative. Its unsolicited opinion may thus stand as a monument
to its watchdog function to control state procedure. This happened in
Terminiello v. Chicago'24 where the Court seized upon a charge to the
United States in 1933. In 1948, 1949 and 1950 there were apparently even more. . . ." See
also Allen, "Due Process and State Criminal Procedures: Another Look," 48 Northwestern
L. Rev. 16 (1953) and Garfinkel, "The Fourteenth Amendment and State Criminal Pro-
ceedings-'Ordered Liberty' or 'Just Deserts'," 41 Calif. L. Rev. 672 (1953). Probably in
this field the Court is entering on a period when it will systematize and rationalize its
past pronouncements rather than break new ground. This conclusion of Allen, supra, is
justified in the Irvine case.
119 See text supra at note 59.
120 See text supra at note 119.
121 justice Brandeis in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288 at 346
(1936). See also Note "Avoidance of Constitutional Issues in Civil Rights Cases," 48 Col.
L. Rev. 427 (1948).
122 Wilson v. Cook, 327 U.S. 474 (1946); Flournoy v. Wiener, 321 U.S. 253 (1944);
First National Bank v. Kentucky, 9 Wall. 353 (U.S. 1869); Otis v. Bacon, 7 Cranch
589 (U.S. 1813).
123 306 U.S. 717 (1938).
124 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
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jury which it thought erroneous even though this "ground for reversal
was explicitly disclaimed on behalf of Terminiello at the bar of the
Court."'25 This action of the Court, however understandable and de-
sirable stands as evidence of what is characteristically the exercise of
the legislative function viz., the promulgation of rules to determine fu-
ture action. 2 6
To this extraordinary method by which the Court may influence and
correct what it considers amiss in the lower courts must be added its
ordinary function of choice among the petitions for certiorari. In 1952,
out of 1025 such petitions only 113 (or just over 11 per cent) were
granted.127  Very frequently a petition is granted because of the exist-
ence of contrary decisions by the Courts of Appeal in the different cir-
cuits. But frequently the reason given is simply "the importance of the
question." The Court in deciding which cases to accept and which to
reject is consciously giving direction and guidance to the evolution of
American law.
In recent years the Court has had before it many cases in which it
might have determined that race segregation as practiced in educational
institutions, railroads and buses and other public facilities amounted
per se to a violation of the due process clauses. 2 In one way or another
it has succeeded in avoiding the issue. But today it has consolidated
for argument and decision five cases where it is probable the issue will
be squarely met. 29 It is, of course, impossible to foretell what the de-
125 Justice Frankfurter, 337 U.S. 1 at 12 (1949). Chief Justice Vinson said:
The offending sentence (in the charge to the jury] had heretofore gone completely
undetected. It apparently was not even noticed, much less excepted to, by the peti-
tioner's counsel at the trial. No objection was made to it in the two Illinois appellate
tribunals which reviewed the case. Nor was it mentioned in the petition for certiorari
or the briefs in this court.
337 U.S. 1 at 10. See also, "Scope of Supreme Court Review: The Terminiello Case in
Focus," 59 Yale L.J. 971 (1950) and "Jurisdiction of the United States Suprenie Court
to Consider Errors not Raised in State Court," 21 Miss. L.J. 278 (1950).
126 This is precisely what the French courts are forbidden to do by Article 5 of the
Napoleonic Code.
127 Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts 67-68 (1952).
128 The cases are conveniently annotated in 94 L. Ed. 1121 (1950). The leading cases
on educational institutions are: McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950);
Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) ; Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 332 U.S. 631 (1948);
Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938). See also, "Grade School Segregation: The Latest
Attack on Racial Discrimination," 61 Yale L.J. 730 (1952). The leading cases on railroad
and buses are:' Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 (1946); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S.
537 (1896). See also District of Columbia v. John R. Thompson Co., 346 U.S. 100
(1953).
129 Brown v. Board of Education, 98 F. Supp. 797 (D. Kansas 1951), order of reargu-
ment, Brown v. Board of Education, 344 U.S. 1 (1952).
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cision will be. The case has been argued twice and both bar and press
are eagerly awaiting the outcome. Already the Court has given portent,
if not of what it will decide, at least of what it wants to consider. After
the first argument the Court invited counsel, upon reargument, to dis-
cuss a list of issues which shows clearly that the Court is seriously con-
sidering the particular kind of decree it can make in order to bring
about a gradual and thus more palatable cessation of segregation in
this important matter where constitutional questions are inextricably
interlaced with an emotionally and highly charged congerie of mores
and customs of the people."' Doubtless the Court is to be congratulated
in undertaking to consider this important question asked by thousands
130 The list of issues on which the Court requested discussion [345 U.S. 972 (1953)]
is as follows:
1. What evidence is there that the Congress which submitted and the State legisla-
tures and conventions which ratified the Fourteenth Amendment contemplated or did
not contemplate, understood or did not understand, that it would abolish segregation
in public schools?
2. If neither the Congress in submitting nor the States in ratifying the Fourteenth
Amendment understood that compliance with it would require the immediate abolition
of segregation in public schools, was it nevertheless the understanding of the framers
of the Amendment
(a) that future Congresses might, in the exercise of their power under section 5
of the Amendment, abolish such segregation, or
(b) that it would be within the judicial power, in light of future conditions, to
construe the Amendment as abolishing such segregation of its own force?
3. On the assumption that the answers to questions 2 (a) and (b) do not dispose
of the issue, is it within the judicial power, in construing the Amendment, to abolish
segregation in public schools?
4. Assuming it is decided that segregation in public schools violates the Four-
teenth Amendment
(a) would a decree necessarily follow providing that, within the limits set by
normal geographic school districting, Negro children should forthwith be admitted
to schools of their choice, or
(b) may this Court, in the exercise of its equity powers, permit an effective
gradual adjustment to be brought about from existing segregated systems to a system
not based on color distinctions?
5. On the assumption on which questions 4 (a) and (b) are based, and assuming
further that this Court will exercise its equity powers to the end described in ques-
tion 4 (b),
(a) should this Court formulate detailed decrees in these cases;
(b) if so what specific issues should the decrees reach;
(c) should this Court appoint a special master to hear evidence with a view
to recommending specific terms for such decrees;
(d) should this Court remand to the courts of first instance with directions to
frame decrees in these cases, and if so what general directions should the decrees of
this court include and what procedures should the courts of first instance follow in
arriving at the specific terms of more detailed decrees?
The Attorney General of the United States is invited to take part in the oral
argument and to file an additional brief if he so desires.
Attorney General Brownell in a brief filed before the Court on November 27, 1953 stated
that the Court had full authority and a duty to outlaw racial segregation in the nation's
public schools, that an anti-segregation ruling would require the revision of school laws
in at least 17 states and he suggested a one-year transition period with allowance for a
further reasonable extension. Associated Press Release, November 28, 1953.
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of people, but the answer bids fair to be a determination of broad policy
that has all the characteristics of a legislative and few of the charac-
teristics of a judicial decision. 3'
If we admit that the Court is engaging in direct and immediate legis-
lation what may be said for or against it. If the Court is a third house,
black robed and pro haec vice mistakenly called Justices, we must ask,
is its work effective and praiseworthy? It is, after all, of minor im-
portance that the nine men carry a deceptive label. None of the law men
is deceived by it and only the naive and uninitiated will object.
Against the exercise of this power one may contend that (a) it is
unconstitutional; (b) it is not forthright, it is an upper house mas-
querading as a court; (c) it is not orderly, it operates by fits and starts
depending on the arrival of a case before the court.
To each of these objections it may be answered:
(a) It is as constitutional as the historic and settled doctrine of
judicial review itself. This doctrine was settled 150 years ago in Mar-
bury v. Madison and, without a constitutional amendment its denial
today would be unthinkable. That being so, the right of the Supreme
Court to interpret the due process clauses is unquestionably constitu-
tional, and if the judges are to interpret at all they must be free to in-
terpret, each according to his sincere conviction. Thus the series of
cases writing Adam Smith economics into the Constitution is as consti-
tutional as the later series holding in effect that the Court will not in-
validate, as unconstitutional, statutes regulating the conduct of business.
The earlier series flowed from a sincere conviction that due process
referred to natural law and that natural law was equivalent to the sys-
tem of economics then considered normal by a majority of the Court.
Now that natural law and Adam Smith economics have less general
acceptance and are not convincing to a majority of the Court, it is
to be expected that the Court will allow greater legislative control of
business. The above observation specifies only one argument that has
been effective. Undoubtedly there are a dozen others but whatever the
argument, if the majority of the Court is convinced by it, a decision
131 Since the text here was completed the Supreme Court has rendered a decision in
this case. According to an Associated Press dispatch of May 17, 1954, the Court said:
"Therefore, we hold that the plaintiffs [negro parents] and others similarly situated for
whom the action has been brought are, by reason of the segregation complained of, de-
prived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment."
This disposition makes unnecessary any discussion whether such segregation also violates
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
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in accordance therewith is constitutional and should occasion no sur-
prise.
(b) The objection that this method is not forthright legislating is
more serious. The contention is that if we are to have a second upper
house with power to veto legislation upon the arrival of a case before
the court, such a revolutionary doctrine should come in through the
front door of constitutional amendment and not through the back door
which, in this instance, is improperly called judicial interpretation. This
argument seems theoretically unassailable. Practically there are objec-
tions to it. For over a century the American people have been fervently
engaged in the worship of the Constitution that in many quarters sur-
passes, in intensity, the worship of a king. They have amended their
constitution 22 times but the Eighteenth Amendment of 1919 (impos-
ing prohibition of intoxicating liquors) had to be repealed in 1933 by
the Twenty-first. Since then, Congress is a bit gun shy of amendments,
and it mistrusts its own judgment. To suggest that a constitutional
amnendment providing that the Supreme Court should act as a third
legislative chamber to veto legislation whenever a case is properly
brought before it would disturb the opinions of so many that it would
have no chance of passage. It would, in fact, require a complete over-
hauling of our scheme of the separation of powers. It matters not that
the opinions of the many are erroneously held. It is certain that they
are held by persons sufficiently numerous to defeat any amendment pro-
posed. We see then this situation: A great nation whose citizens once
discussed, proposed and passed a great Constitution has somehow lost,
in the blindness of its worship of that Constitution, confidence in its
own ability to discuss, propose and pass an amendment. The people prefer
instead to tolerate constitution making that arrives bit by bit under the
cloak of judicial interpretation.
(c) The objection that the exercise of the power is not orderly but
depends on the arrival of a case is serious enough but not as serious as
it sounds. Cases arrive before the Supreme Court not blindly or auto-
matically, but are brought by lawyers who, for the most part, are per-
fectly aware of the process outlined in this paper. The wise lawyer
knows that his chances under the due process clauses depends, not on
any intrinsic meaning of those clauses, but precisely upon his ability
to persuade a majority of the Supreme Court of the wisdom and reason-
ableness of his contention. If this in turn depends on the background,
the education and the prejudices of the nine justices of the Court, he
knows too, that all of these are influenced by the state of opinion among
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the American people. And it is this last, in turn, which would determine
directly the existence and content" of a constitutional amendment. It is
probably true that the average American has as much confidence in the
wisdom of constitutional amendments which come strained through the
three fold process of the decision of the lawyer to bring the case, the
careful argument of the case on both sides and the critical appraisal of
those arguments by the Supreme Court, as he has in the wisdom of con-
stitutional amendments (one of which, the Eighteenth, went sour on
him) which come through the conventional amending process. In any
case, before he decides to abandon the one and insist on the other, he
must be fully aware of the problem and after debate and full consider-
ation decide what he wants. But today there is no widespread discus-
sion of this problem. Indeed it exists only for the specialist. The people
will probably continue to worship the Constitution and fail to grasp or
understand this more subtle process of legislating and constitution
making.
